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Should Cost analysis has become a standard tool for the
Government to achieve cost reasonableness in a negotiated
contract. Recently, contractors in the Defense Industry have
begun to guestion the effectiveness of this analytical process
and the necessity of its use. This thesis examines the Should
Cost process, its implementation in the area of overhead cost
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH
Should Cost analysis has become a standard tool for the
Government to achieve cost reasonableness in a negotiated
contract. Recently, this analysis technique has come under
question by government contractors as to its validity and the
necessity for its use. Of particular interest is the area of
contractor overhead costs; due to the amount of dollars
associated with this area of contracting. This research will
examine the Should Cost concept, its implementation in the
area of overhead cost analysis, and analyze the Should Cost
effectiveness as it relates to recommendations and actions
taken by the contractors.
This research will be accomplished by analyzing three
separate Overhead Should Cost studies selected from studies
performed in fiscal years 1985 and 1986.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question:
How effective has the Government been in the
selection and execution of Overhead Should Cost studies?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions:
a. Were selected Overhead Should Cost studies
performed and negotiated by the Government in the most
effective manner?
1
b. What has been the effect of the studies on
relations between the Government and the contractor?
c. How might the Should Cost studies be improved as
an analytical tool in support of contract negotiations?
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to examine and answer
these questions. By doing so, a qualitative insight will be
provided for the military services and acquisition managers
as to the effectiveness of Should Cost studies; particularly
in the overhead cost arena. This analysis may further the
productive use of the Should Cost study.
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
The research will focus on reviewing the Should Cost
concept and the key issues involved in three overhead Should
Cost studies. These studies were conducted at Hughes
Corporation, Fullerton, CA; Sperry Corporation, Great Neck,
NY; and Lockheed Corporation, Sunnyvale, CA . The study will
examine team makeup, relations fostered by the studies,
effects of the studies on negotiations, motivation of
contractors to implement recommendations, follow-up
considerations, and impact of the studies. The study will
not examine other Should Cost efforts, but will deal strictly
with the three studies indicated.
E. METHODOLOGY
The Research data were collected from the reports of the
Should Cost analyses at each contractor site. Interviews
were conducted with the individuals representing the
contractor at each site, the team leaders representing each
Government on-site contracting office (NAVPRO Lockheed,
NAVPRO Sperry, and DCASPRO Hughes) , and Government team
leaders for each Should cost study. They were queried about
the Should Cost analysis performed and whether or not the
study resulted in any substantial cost benefit to the
contractor, and/or savings to the Government. Questions
included:
1. Industry:
a. How does your industry view the Should Cost
analysis?
b. What important issues are germane to the Should
Cost analysis?
c. What were the key problems encountered between
industry and the Government during the Should Cost analysis?
d. What do you see as the benefits to the Should
Cost analysis as it was performed?
e. Which of the Should Cost study recommendations
were implemented, which were not implemented, and why?
f. Were you motivated to make the changes
recommended?
g. Did the study foster better relations between
your industry and the Government?
h. How should the study be changed?
2 . Government
a. How were the personnel used in the study
selected?
b. What were their qualifications to analyze the
particular area assigned in the study?
c. How did the Government plan to use the results of
the study in negotiations?
d. How does the Government motivate the contractor
to implement the recommendations of the study?
e. Was follow-up action necessary or desired, to
assure compliance with the recommendations?
f. Did the study foster better relations between the
Government and the contractor?
g. How should the study be changed?
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I defined the research problem and its
importance. The objective, scope, and methodology of the
thesis was also presented. Included in this chapter were
basic interview questions for industry and Government that
will serve as the framework for analysis of the three Should
Cost studies presented.
Chapter II presents the issue of Should Cost analysis as
it applies to the acquisition process.
Chapter III presents the three Should Cost studies, and
the background and environment surrounding the studies.
Chapter IV will focus upon key issue areas of each Should
Cost study. Particular emphasis will be upon the response of
contractor and Government persons interviewed, towards the
Government's performance of those studies.
Chapter V presents analysis of key issues developed
through research and interviews with Government and
contractor personnel.
Chapter VI provides conclusions based upon findings and
recommendations regarding the use of the Should Cost process.




The study was somewhat limited by information not
specifically made available to the researcher in each Should
Cost study. These data were limited due to the confidential
nature of some of the cost and pricing data in the studies.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
With the current political and public concerns over the
budget deficit and defense spending in particular, more and
more emphasis is being directed toward saving money in the
defense procurement arena. The recent discoveries of cost
overruns and enormous cost growth in the defense market, has
caused the Government to seek cost savings at every
opportunity [Ref. l:p. 2]. Additionally, it appears there
will be fewer defense dollars to spend in the coming years
[Ref. 2:p. 2]. All agencies of the Government should act
uniformly to improve their stewardship of these funds. It is
to this end that the concept of Should Cost is to be
explored
.
B. THE SHOULD COST CONCEPT
The Should Cost concept began in the civilian economy. A
large, national chain of consumer-use goods used the
technique for a number of years when dealing with the
suppliers of its appliances, hardware, and other goods [Ref.
3:pp. 1-5]. The use and application of the Should Cost
concept resulted in significantly and consistently lower
prices from these suppliers. The use of the Should Cost
analysis encouraged those suppliers to constantly improve
their operations by manufacturing their products in the most
6
economical ways, in order to retain the large product orders
from this national chain. Due to the retail chain's large
size, the Should Cost concept was an effective hammer to use
over their suppliers. [Ref. 3:pp. 1-5]
A departure from the traditional method of contract
price analysis used by the military occurred in 1968, when a
Navy procurement team used a new method of cost analysis to
achieve substantial savings on a fixed price contract for
aircraft engines. This new technique saved the Government
over $100 million and became popularly known as a type of
cost analysis called "should cost." [Ref. 4:p. 4]
The Should Cost technique is a vigorous form of cost
analysis that evaluates the prime contractor and
subcontractors' proposals and plant operations, on a highly
coordinated basis, to identify potential cost savings due to
uneconomical operations. The methodology of the analysis is
to determine what the contractor's cost ought to be in the
various production areas.
The Should Cost analysis team is usually made up of
specialists in engineering, pricing, audit, Government
procurement, and management. These specialists review in
great detail the contractor's engineering and manufacturing
operations, cost estimating procedures, accounting
procedures, purchasing procedures, make-or-buy decisions,
organization structure, and any elements required for cost
and management control of the procurement system. [Ref.
3:pp. 1-2]
The purpose of the in-depth analysis is not only to
identify the contractor's uneconomical procurement practices,
but to give the Government a negotiation position that will
support the contracting officer's responsibility to achieve a
fair and reasonable contract price [Ref. 3:p. 20]. This
short term benefit is coupled with the longer term advantage
of achieving a more efficient and economical contractor
operation, which will translate into lower contract prices
over the life of the procurement. [Ref. 4: p. 5]
The Should Cost approach to cost estimating differs from
the traditional cost analyzing approach in four ways. First,
the Should Cost approach delves deeper into the contractor's
operation and does so over an extended period of time [Ref.
3:p. 2]. Secondly, the Government challenges inefficiencies
in the contractor's operation to a far greater extent than
that of any other cost analysis [Ref. 3:p. 2]. The third
difference is that the Should Cost analysis team resides in
the contractor's plant until the analysis is complete [Ref.
5:p. 21]. Finally, each Should Cost team is independent of
the program or contractor under review [Ref. 5:p. 21].
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
,
provides
uniform policies and procedures for acquisitions by executive
agencies of the Federal Government [Ref. 6:p. 3]. It denotes
the Should Cost concept as a specialized form of cost
analysis, to be initiated prior to negotiations.
The FAR states that the Should Cost analysis is to be
used to "evaluate the cost of production programs by
evaluating and challenging a contractor's management and
operating systems or portions thereof." [Ref. 6: para. 15.810
(a)] It denotes the use of "an integrated team of Government
contracting, contract administration, pricing, audit, and
engineering representatives." [Ref. 6:para. 15.810(a)] The
objective of the Should Cost analysis is to evaluate the
contractor's existing workforce, methods of operation,
materials, facilities, and management and operating systems,
in order to identify inefficient or uneconomical business
practices. This evaluation will be used to promote both long
and short range improvements in the contractor's business.
Additionally, by delineating their findings and their impact
on the contractor's cost, the Government will be in a much
better position to develop and support price objectives for
negotiations. [Ref. 6:para. 15.810(a)]
The scope of the Should Cost review can range from a
full-scale, in-depth analysis of the contractor's entire
operation, to a smaller review of specific cost elements or
portions of the contractor's operation. Of course, the
larger the effort, the larger and more complex the Should
Cost analysis team becomes. The team will submit a separate
analysis team report, prepared in accordance with agency
9
procedures. The contracting officer will consider the
findings and recommendations contained in the report, when
negotiating the contract. [Ref. 6:para. 15.810(b) and (c)]
C. BENEFITS AND CONCERNS REGARDING SHOULD COST ANALYSIS
Many benefits have been observed in the use of the Should
Cost method of analysis. These benefits have not been
achieved, however, without concerns towards the Should Cost
study's effectiveness. This section will examine the
various benefits and related concerns in using the Should
Cost method of analysis. This section will rely, in part,
upon a recent study evaluating the use of Should Cost studies
in the Federal Government. [Ref. 5:pp.21-25]
Chapter IV of this thesis explores the actual infusion of
these benefits and concerns in the three Should Cost studies
researched. The benefits and concerns are therefore listed
as background information.
1 . Benefits
a. Setting the Negotiation Target
The Should Cost analysis should, as much as
possible, set the target for the ACO or other negotiating
official to use in the negotiations with the contractor.
This target figure should be supported with the information
and data necessary to defend the Government's position
throughout the negotiation. In this way, the Government
negotiator will be able to negotiate a more reasonable price
10
for the Government than if he lacked this information. [Ref.
5:p. 21]
b. Identifying Non-recurring Costs
The Should Cost analysis should be able to
identify non-recurring costs, such as start up costs, that
would otherwise be difficult to uncover under traditional
analytical techniques. Under production contracts, these
costs are difficult to segregate and often are paid out
several times by the Government in later production
contracts. The Should Cost study can point out these costs
that are frequently hidden by the contractor. [Ref. 5: p. 22]
c. Identifying and Correcting Inef f iciences
Inefficient operations in the contractor's
organization are frequently found during the Should Cost
study. This information is extremely important to the
contractor, as he strives to be competitive with other
contractors in his industry. The highly skilled Should Cost
team can identify these deficiencies and recommend methods to
correct the problems to the contractor. [Ref. 5:p. 22]
d. Foster Better Government and Industry Relations
When the Should Cost team conducts a formal,
professional, and thorough analyses of the contractor's
operations, the contractor is "generally impressed and
commends the Should Cost team members on their efforts."
[Ref. 5:p. 23] The attitude between the contractor and the
Government is often changed from antagonistic to supportive
11
of the team's endeavors. The recommendations for
improvement, therefore, can be taken as truly helpful in
nature by the contractor and can indeed foster better
relations between industry and Government.
2 . Concerns
The concerns associated with performing a Should Cost
analysis are important to note and must be considered
whenever contemplating a Should Cost endeavor.
a. Personnel
Obtaining the proper personnel to make-up a team
of "expert talent" required to adequately perform a Should
Cost study, is difficult to say the least. Trying to
assemble personnel that are fully qualified in their
specialty field and tasking them to leave their present jobs
for three to six months to conduct an analysis at a
contractor's plant, can be a logistic nightmare. [Ref. 5:p.
24]
Additionally, some training of members needs to
be done in order to motivate team members and to make them
more mobile in the Should Cost analysis arena. The time and
resources are rarely available to fulfill this important
requirement
.
By not having properly trained or experienced
personnel throughout the Should Cost team, the conclusions
and recommendations presented to the contractor will lack the
validity and conviction necessary to motivate the contractor
12
to implement those findings. The Should Cost team effort is
thereby limited to the qualified resources available in their
team structure.
b. Cost
The Should Cost technique is, by far, the most
costly analytical technique employed by the Government [Ref.
4:p. 5]. The time involved at the contractor's plant carries
a large price tag. The large size and technical requirements
of a three to six month in-depth analysis requires a large
Government team.
History shows that past Should Cost efforts have
required from as few as eight persons, to as many as eighty
[Ref. 5:p. 23]. The cost of transportation, salaries, food,
and lodging for such a team can be significant. [Ref. 5 : p
.
24]
c. Planning and Organization
The initial planning to organize the Should Cost
effort can be tremendous. As previously mentioned, the
personnel requirements must be determined. This should be
done with consideration to the contractor's size and scope of
work to be analyzed. the make-up of the team is critical to
the analysis and will have an effect on the amount of time
spent at the contractor's plant, as well as the contractor's
judgement of the resulting recommendations. The leader of
the team must ensure that these specialists in their
13
respective fields are unbiased and professional in every
aspect of their job. [Ref. 5:p. 25]
Contact with the contractor when first setting up
the analysis, as well as continued open communications, must
be maintained. Getting positive response and cooperation
from the contractor is essential for a smooth and efficient
analysis to be performed. This open, two-way communication
must be initiated carefully and with proper tact, to ensure
full participation by the contractor,
d. Applicability
The Should Cost concept identifies cost savings
and recommendations to achieve what the product "should cost"
the Government. The use and implementation of the
recommendations by the Government and contractor are not
always assured.
The Government uses the information presented in
the analysis as a budgeting and negotiation tool. The extent
to which these recommendations are pushed upon the contractor
during negotiations, and the power of the recommendations as
a club for the Government, are yet to be determined.
The contractor, on the other hand, is well aware
that the findings and recommendations are to be used by the
Government as a negotiating tool. What motivates the
contractor to implement the recommendations? How confident
is he that the ACO, when negotiating with the study's
results, knows the significance of each of the findings?
14
What kind of support does the ACO have, besides the written
report, to justify his positions at the negotiations? These
questions pose a problem for the Government that should be
addressed
.
D. SHOULD COST OVERHEAD CONSIDERATIONS
Why look specifically at the overhead area as a Should
Cost study? Over the past several years, there has been
increasing criticism of the Government's management of the
expenditures incurred by defense contractors. As a possible
result of this deficiency, there have been large cost
overruns on some of the major weapon systems being procured.
These criticisms were reported during the hearings of the
subcommittee on the Economy in Government of the Joint
Economic Committee, chaired by Senator William Proxmire.
This committee was highly critical of the practices in the
Department of Defense and pointed out the "existence of
institutional arrangements and procurement practices which
have wasted billions of taxpayers dollars." [Ref. 7:p. 1]
The area of overhead costs contain the most volatile cost
considerations, both for the contractor and for the cost
analyst [Ref. 7:p. 2]. The management and control of
overhead costs contain many deep-rooted problems. These
costs continue to rise from year to year due to the results
of inflation, increased labor costs, and other economic
factors. [Ref. 7:p. 3]
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Analysis of the overhead area is of grave concern to the
Government, since sudden, unexpected increases in the
overhead rates, have a corresponding effect on the costs of
that contract. Although changes in the overhead rates can
occur at anytime during the life of a contract, the initial
overhead rates, established by the contractor, are what the
Should Cost efforts focus upon.
An important element for the Should Cost team to
consider, is that, at any time, a contractor can have many
Government contracts on which he is actively working. As all
of these contracts will absorb their share of the overhead
costs, there is extreme pressure on the contractor to control
and equally allocate his overhead costs. It must also be
understood that there is always the overriding incentive for
the contractor to achieve the maximum amount of overhead
consideration on each Government contract. Therefore, the
area of overhead cost is highly subjective, and can be
denoted as an area of possible maximum cost savings to the
Government. [Ref. 7:p. 4]
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to give the reader some
background into the Should Cost concept by focusing upon the
history, technique, and management considerations of this
type of cost analysis. Some of the benefits of Should Cost
analysis were presented, as well as some of the concerns
16
associated with its use. Finally the chapter looked at
overhead cost considerations, when performing a Should Cost
study in the overhead area.
17
III. SHOULD COST OVERHEAD STUDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
Each of the Overhead Should Cost studies that this
researcher chose to study, contained findings and
recommendations that were negotiated with the respective
company for implementation. Some of these findings were
unique to the company being studied and some were found to be
similar in nature to two or all three of the companies. This
chapter will discuss the background behind the selection of
these companies as Overhead Should Cost study candidates, the
areas of review for each study, the major factors having the
greatest impact on the development of the overhead rates, and
the analysis of these factors.
B. BACKGROUND
In December 1984, the Department of Defense (DoD)
initiated a program to study and possibly reduce contractor
overhead costs on DoD contracts. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense sent a Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, that directed each Military Service and the DLA,
to perform one Should Cost study of plant-wide overhead at
one contractor location during fiscal year (FY) 1985, and
another contractor location during FY 1986. This initiative
was intended to identify areas of potential cost savings and
18
areas where the Government could improve its own oversight.
[Ref. 8:p. 1]
In compliance with this DoD overhead cost reduction
initiative, the Navy performed Overhead Should Cost studies
at two contractor locations during FY 1985 and two contractor
locations in FY 1986. The studies in FY 1985 were performed
at Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc., Sunnyvale, CA,
and at Grumman Corporation, Bethpage, NY. During FY 1986,
the two studies were performed at McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft
Company, St. Louis, MO, and at Sperry Corporation, Great
Neck, NY. This researcher selected one study from each of
the two fiscal year studies performed, to analyze in this
thesis. The Overhead Should Cost studies selected were:
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, and Sperry Corporation.
Additionally, in FY 1986, the DLA sent a letter to the
Defense Contract Administration Services Region (DCASR), Los
Angeles, CA, requesting an in-depth Overhead Should Cost
review of Hughes Aircraft Company, Fullerton, CA. This study
was also selected by this researcher, to compare with the two
Navy studies.
C. AREAS OF REVIEW FOR LOCKHEED AND SPERRY
In both of the Navy Overhead Should Cost studies, six
areas of responsibility were designated for analysis.
19
1. Organization and Accounting System
The objective of this portion of the study was to
provide historical, present, and future organizational
structure of the two Companies. Additionally, the cost
accounting structures, Cost Accounting Standards (CAS)
compliance, and overhead structures were analyzed. [Ref.
9:p. 10 and Ref. 10:p. 7]
2. Indirect Employees
The objective of this portion of the study was to
determine the acceptability and methodology of proposed
indirect employee staffing at the overhead pool level. Also,
the driving factors behind the justification of the existence
of the indirect employees was investigated. This
investigation included validation of job descriptions,
indirect classifications, CAS implications, and review of the
quantifiable method of justifying existing headcount figures.
[Ref. 9:p. 13 and Ref. 10:p. 9]
3. Business Base
In this area, the Should Cost team analyzed the
business base and future business forecasts, to establish
trends and arrive at specific overhead rate recommendations.
The chief analytical tools employed included actual cost
experience, historical forecasting accuracy, and regression
analysis. [Ref. 9:p. 11 and Ref. 10:p. 15]
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4. Compensation
Under the area of compensation, the teams looked at
various forms of compensation (such as wages, salaries, and
employee benefits), analyzed various industrial activities,
developed data in a manner that would make it suitable for
use in negotiations, and developed recommendations for use in
the Forward Pricing Rate Agreement. The purpose of the
analysis was to identify data that can be used to establish
reasonableness of the various expenses to be reviewed. [Ref.
9:p. 17 and Ref. 10 :p. 11]
5. Facilities/Fixed and Semi-Fixed Costs
This portion of the study was used to develop a
Should Cost perspective on fixed and semi-fixed costs,
including facilities and Independent Research and Development
and Bid and Proposal (IR&D/B&P) costs. This was done using
historical performance and past forecasted trends in each
category under consideration. Cost accounts examined
included insurance costs, building and property rental, plant
rearrangement expenses, heat, light, and power, repair and
maintenance, telephone expense, and corporate allocations.
These data were used to develop a negotiation position for
the negotiating team. [Ref. 9:p. 38 and Ref. 10:p. 15]
6. Automated Data Process (ADP) and Other Expenses
In this area, the study conducted a technical review
of the ADP organization and operation, including mainframe,
personal computers, office automation equipment, and
21
maintenance of these systems, to determine if these areas
were being managed effectively. [Ref. 9:p. 40 and Ref . 10:p.
17]
In each of these functional areas, a Overhead Should
Cost team was assembled and made an in-depth study of that
cost area. Mr. E. G. Cammack, of the then Office of Naval
Acquisition Support (ONAS), was appointed director of the
Lockheed study by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) (ASN, S&L). He was charged with
the responsibility of conducting the study and reporting the
findings. In as much as the Air Force is the largest single
Lockheed customer, they were also invited to participate in
the study, and did so.
In the Sperry study, Mr. J. W. Ford, Jr., was
appointed by ASN (S&L) as director of the study, and was
charged with the responsibility of conducting the study and
reporting the findings.
D. AREAS OF REVIEW FOR HUGHES
In the Hughes study, five functional areas were
identified for review. They were:
1 . Business Base
The study in this area focused on trends and specific
overhead rates in the areas of future awards, manpower
requirements, IR&D/B&P, software to support the base,
forecasting and standards applied, direct and indirect rate
22
ratios, and direct versus indirect functions towards
headcount reductions and labor rates. Cost experience and
historical analysis were the key indicators used in this
area. [Ref. 11 :p. 12]
2. Facilities
The purpose of this portion of the study was to
identify the fixed and semi-fixed costs applicable to the
facilities function. This area included utilities,
transportation and travel, facilities expenses, maintenance
and repair, janitorial services, rearrangement expenses,
facilities engineering, and supplies. [Ref. 11 :p. 19]
3. Compensation
In this area of the study, the team concentrated on
the development of data to support negotiations. Areas of
concern included payroll expense, accrued vacation expenses,
training, education, overtime, insurance, pensions, and the
overall compensation system utilized by DCASR L.A. These
data were developed to aid in establishing the reasonableness
of the various expenses noted. [Ref. 11 :p. 17]
4. Financial Systems Review
The object of this portion of the study was to
provide a review and evaluation of the accounting, budgeting,
billing, estimating, and internal auditing systems employed
at Hughes. Additionally, compliance with CAS rules and
regulations was determined. [Ref. 11 :p. 18]
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5. Other
In this section of the study, the focus of attention
was on the ADP organization and utilization. cost of capital
in this area was examined, as well as microcomputer and
personal computer installation and use. Management of these
systems and adequacy of documentation were key
considerations. [Ref. ll:p. 22]
As with the Navy Should Cost studies, teams were
assembled and assigned according to the five functional areas
addressed. The Should Cost study director for the effort at
Hughes was Mr. S. P. Simmons, Director of Contract
Management, DCASR Los Angeles. He was appointed by the
Director of DLA to lead the study and report the findings.
The major findings of this study, as well as the major
findings of the Navy effort, are listed in the following
section.
E. RESULTS OF THE STUDIES
The major factors which had the greatest impact on the
development of each Overhead Should Cost study recommended
overhead rates were noted in each Overhead Should Cost study
report. These factors, as identified by contractor, were:
1 . Sperry
a. Contractor's lack of detailed supporting budgets
and estimated cost data beyond one year for overhead rate
projection purposes.
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b. Increases in forecasted direct material and
direct labor bases.
c. Reductions in projected headcount
.
d. Use of current Navy guideline of 3.5% yearly
escalation factor for direct and indirect salaried and hourly
compensation.
e. Use of Air force Tri-Service Negotiations
recommended IR&D/B&P ceiling amounts.
f. Weaknesses in the management of personal




a. The use of current Navy guideline of 3% yearly
inflation factor for direct and indirect salaried and hourly
compensation
.
b. Increase in the forecasted business base.
c. The use of 1985 final negotiated IR&D/B&P ceiling
amount as the recommended IR&D/B&P amount for the years 1986
through 1988, based on current Navy policy. A 3% increase to
reflect inflation was made for 1989 and 1990.
d. A lower rate of increase for ADP costs based on a
more reasonable and constant relationship between computing
costs and the direct labor allocation base.
3 Hughes
a. The use of current Navy guideline of 3% yearly
inflation factor for direct and indirect salaried and hourly
compensation.
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b. The direct headcount at Hughes was reduced across
the board by an estimated 5%, due to schedule delinquencies
and program losses.
c. A reduction in facilities due to an increase in
leased facilities during a period of declining business and
excess square footage not being utilized.
d. A decrease in utilities expenses due to decreased
facilities costs and utility company projections.
e. Decreased ADP equipment costs by questioning
indirect versus direct cost allocation, improved
documentation flow, and tighter quality controls.
F. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Several of the major factors listed in the preceding
section show similar trends in the overhead cost analysis
area. Although the specific impact on the overhead rates
were different for each study, the similarities noted show
where areas of impact may be encountered, on an industry-wide
basis. Those factors that were found to be prevalent in at
least two of the Overhead Should Cost studies were: the use
of current Navy inflation factors for direct and indirect
salaried and hourly compensation, an increase in the
forecasted business base, headcount reductions, and ADP cost
estimating
.
The use of the current Navy guideline for yearly
inflation (3.5% for Sperry, and 3% for Lockheed and Hughes)
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for direct and indirect salaried and hourly compensation
brought the increase in the forward pricing rates under a
more constant inflationary increase. The increase was
closer to actual inflation rates experienced in the past
year, and real GNP growth expectations for the succeeding
year
.
By decreasing the forecasted direct and indirect labor
rates, a large cost savings was projected for out-years in
each study. In each case, all three of the companies were
projecting increased business, resulting in expansion of the
business base. The increased labor rates were based upon
this assumption and were correctly identified and lowered
through the Should Cost analysis.
By introducing improvements and reducing inefficiency,
headcounts were reduced at Sperry and Hughes. This layoff of
non-productive personnel should contribute to increased
productivity of the personnel now staffed.
In the area of ADP equipment, all three companies were
found to need greater management attention. Each Should Cost
study pointed out specific areas for improvement that will
lead to significantly lower costs of operation and
maintenance of equipment.
G . SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the background behind the
selection of each of the contractors to participate in the
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Overhead Should Cost studies, areas of review for each
contractor, the factors having the greatest impact on the
development of the overhead rates in each case, and analysis
of these factors.
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IV. EXAMINATION OP STUDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines each of the three Overhead Should
Cost studies discussed in Chapter III. This analysis is
based upon the research questions outlined in Chapter I and
will be categorized into sections, based upon the specific
questions asked during interviews. The responses to these
questions were obtained by this researcher through personal
interviews and telephone conversations. For each question,
an answer will be presented by the individuals interviewed in
association with each Overhead Should Cost study. The
opinions expressed by these individuals will be presented by
organizational entity; Government Buying Agencies (Assistant
Secretary of the Navy/Shipbuilding and Logistics, Defense
Logistics Agency, and Naval Sea Systems Command), Government
Contract Administration (Defense Contract Administration
Services Plant Representative Office and Navy Plant
Representative Offices), and each of the contractor
representatives
.
B. OVERHEAD SHOULD COST TEAM ORGANIZATION AND MANNING
1
. Government Buying Agencies Viewpoint
a. Sperry and Lockheed Studies
The organization of the two ASN sponsored
Overhead Should Cost studies were similar and will be
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discussed together. The organization of personnel in both
studies consisted of a Director (charged with the
responsibility of conducting the study and reporting the
results), Deputy Director (assistant to the Director), and
Team Leaders for each area of concentrated study. [Ref. 9: p.
41; Ref. 10:p. 25]
An Oversight Committee was developed in both
studies, consisting of the Director, Deputy Director, and
representatives from the Navy, Air Force (for the Lockheed
study inclusively), and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).
Their function was to evaluate the team's findings and assist
in the formulation of the final position. [Ref. 9:p. 1; Ref.
10:p. 2]
Personnel for the two teams were selected
primarily by the team leaders in each study [Ref. 12]. The
team leaders were selected by the Deputy Directors, with the
concurrence of the Directors in each study [Ref. 13]. Team
Leaders were selected on the basis of their previous
experience in the area for which they were to be responsible
(organization, accounting, facilities, ADP, etc.). Their
track record at their present command was also considered
important , as these individuals were to be given the
responsibility of auditing on a fairly independent basis
[Ref. 13]. Availability of the individuals was taken into
consideration, since they would be away from their parent
command for anywhere from three weeks to three months. With
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this fact in mind, once in awhile, a little pressure from
higher sources (like ASN) , would need to be exercised, in
order to get the required individual released to the team.
[Ref. 13]
The teams were organized into specific review
areas, with a Team Leader in charge of the analysis of that
cost area. Team members came from a variety of commands
including, NAVSEA, DCAA, Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command (SPAWAR), China Lake Naval Weapons Station, the
NAVPROs associated with each study, and the Air Force Plant
Representative Office (AFPRO) at Lockheed. [Ref. 9: p. 43;
Ref. 10 :p. 27] The team members were selected by the Deputy
Directors, in coordination with the Team Leaders, using the
same rigid criteria that were used to select the Team Leaders
[Ref. 12].
b. Hughes Study
The Overhead Should Cost team organized for the
effort at Hughes was similar to the other two studies in that
a Director and Deputy Director were selected to conduct the
study and report the results. The selection and coordination
of the Team Leaders and team members was, again, similar to
that of the Sperry and Lockheed studies. One variation
however, was that in the Hughes study, there was a greater
use of the on-site DCASPRO personnel to perform all
functional areas of the study. All of the Team Leaders and
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most of the team members were selected from the DCAS Region
(DCASR) , Los Angeles. [Ref. 14]
One reason for the use of DCASPRO personnel to
perform the study was DLA's position that an in-house effort
would be more efficient and cost effective [Ref. 14].
Therefore, little effort was put forth by DLA to bring
individuals in from outside of the local area to perform the
study [Ref. 15]. The personnel that were brought in from
outside the DCASR were a small group of Army and Air Force
personnel. These personnel turned out to be quite
knowledgeable in the Should Cost process and were a great
help in the functional areas assigned them. [Ref. 16]
2. Government Contract Administration Viewpoint
a. Sperry and Lockheed Studies
Since the Team Leaders and the majority of the
team members were selected by the Deputy Director, the
NAVPROs both felt a little alienated by the studies. In both
studies, the NAVPRO personnel were forced to perform on-the-
job training for each of the non-NAVPRO team members, in
order for these individuals to proceed with their portion of
the study. This was especially true when the contractor's
accounting system was being analyzed. [Ref. 17; Ref. 18]
Additionally, personnel were continually being
introduced into the Should Cost studies, at various stages of
review. Each time a new person was brought into the study,
that person had to be brought up to speed, in order to
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continue analysis of that functional area. The NAVPRO
personnel found themselves breaking in new team members
throughout the study. [Ref. 17; Ref. 18]
In both studies, the ACOs were given the
assignment of being a Team Leader of a particular functional
area. They therefore, did have some say as to the findings
and recommendations of the study; but only in that particular
area. Both ACOs expressed the opinion that they should have
been given a more active role in the studies, as they were
the individuals given ultimate responsibility for future
negotiations, based upon the findings of the studies. [Ref.
17; Ref. 18]
b. Hughes Study
As previously mentioned, the Overhead Should Cost
study at Hughes was performed primarily by the DCASR and
DCASPRO on-site personnel. Personnel interviewed at the
DCASPRO found this to be an effective analysis technique, as
there was little turnover of personnel, and no problem with
having to train new people. Additionally, personnel from
outside of the DCASR organization were very familiar with the
Should Cost form of cost analysis, and needed little
introduction. [Ref. 15]
Even though the DCASR was given the
responsibility of performing the Overhead Should Cost study,
thereby utilizing their own work force, team leaders at the
DCASPRO had the strongest say as to the makeup of the
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functional area teams. This was advantageous, as there was




The contractor's viewpoint at Sperry was one of
cautious concern towards the Overhead Should Cost team as a
whole. Management representatives interviewed noted that the
team members were highly qualified and conducted themselves
admirably during their cost analysis. There was some concern
by the management at Sperry over the lack of understanding of
the accounting system, by those individuals sent in by other
activities. The organization of the team was not of concern,
just the lack of in-plant knowledge that had to be absorbed
by those non-NAVPRO team members. [Ref. 19]
b. Lockheed Study
At Lockheed, management personnel interviewed
stated that they were quite comfortable with the makeup of
the Overhead Should Cost team. They felt that each team
member was professional and straightforward. There was
concern, however, about the individuals brought in from
outside organizations. One individual noted that these
individuals were not responsive to the special problems
embodied in some areas of the cost analysis. It was felt
that these individuals could have worked closer with their
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NAVPRO counterparts in their functional teams to become more
aware of special problem areas. [Ref. 20]
c. Hughes Study
Due to the in-house flavor of the Overhead Should
Cost teams, the management representatives at Hughes found
few difficulties with the organization and makeup of the
Should Cost team. They agreed that the individuals brought
in from other activities (Army and Air Force) were very
knowledgeable in Should Cost study analysis techniques, were
easy to work with, and worked well with their DCASPRO
counterparts. [Ref. 19]
C. RELATIONSHIPS FOSTERED BY THE SHOULD COST STUDIES
1 . Government Buying Agencies Viewpoint
a. Sperry, Lockheed and Hughes Studies
Personnel interviewed expressed the idea that the
Overhead Should Cost studies at all locations improved
relations between the contractors and the Government [Ref.
12; Ref. 13]. It was acknowledged by one interviewee that
the Should Cost type of cost analysis is difficult for the
contractor to try to absorb. Over an extended period, the
contractor can become less enthusiastic about opening his
records to various individuals, from outside organizations.
But, this individual felt that these inconveniences are
outweighed by the useful information that can be gathered by
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the contractor, in order to enhance his position in the
industry. [Ref. 12]
One Government representative noted that it is in
the contractor's best interests to improve relations with the
Government. The Should Cost study gives the contractor the
unique opportunity to deal directly with the higher echelons
of the Government and open more productive communication
channels. In this way, the contractor can have easier access
to needed information and create a stronger bond between
himself and the Government. His future can be greatly
enhanced by positive relations with the Government, even if
he believes those relations to be sound at the present time.
[Ref. 13]
2. Government Contract Administration Viewpoint
a . Sperry Study
In this researcher's analysis, the Overhead
Should Cost study at Sperry resulted in a weakening of the
Government and contractor relationship. In one general area,
the relationship became almost adversarial.
This problem stems from the fact that the
Overhead Should Cost study was mainly performed by
individuals from outside of the contractor's plant. This
team did the in-depth analysis of the contractor's costs,
grouped findings into the functional areas, made
recommendations to the company, and formalized the study into
a negotiation package for the ACO to utilize in negotiations.
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In this case, the ACO was entrusted with the responsibility
of negotiating a package over which neither she nor her
people had much influence. The ACO had to take a hard line
with the company over the findings, without actual hands on
experience with the procedures taken to achieve those
findings. [Ref. 17]
Additionally, the complete Overhead Should Cost
study, including the in-depth analysis of each of the
findings, had not been given to the contractor for analysis.
The NAVPRO ACO pointed out that this lack of information to
the contractor had caused the contractor to take a hard stand
on many of the issues in the study and to be less willing to
work with the NAVPRO on resolving some of the problems
encountered. This led to increased tension between the
NAVPRO and the contractor which was harmful to the Government
- contractor relationship. [Ref. 17]
b. Lockheed Study
The relationship between the Government and
contractor, fostered by the Overhead Should Cost study
performed at Lockheed, does not seem to be improved. The
overall feeling expressed by individuals interviewed at
Lockheed, was that the study did not improve relations at
all; in fact, relations may have declined since the study
ended. [Ref. 18]
As in the Sperry study, the ACO had little input
into the Should Cost findings and was expected to negotiate
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an agreement using other analysts' information. By not
having full knowledge of the background used to formulate the
findings, he found himself taking a harder position in
negotiations than he would have liked. This made it more
difficult for him to deal with Lockheed in many areas of the
negotiations. The typical response from the company to the
ACO, when trying to support the Government position, was:
"That's just the opinion of some outsider who doesn't even
know our system." [Ref. 18] The ACO noted that the company
was not willing to negotiate in many areas, often challenging
that the auditor who performed the analysis did not fully
understand the internal organization of the company. This
situation was felt to be detrimental to the relations between
the Government and the contractor. [Ref. 18]
c. Hughes Study
In the DCASPRO viewpoint, better relations were
fostered between the Government and the contractor, due to
the Overhead Should Cost study performed there. The key, in
this study, seemed to be in how the findings and issues were
presented during negotiations, and the attitude of the
contractor towards the recommendations. [Ref. 15]
Personnel interviewed noted that the issues were
presented in a method that started with the smaller, easier
to define issues, and worked progressively up to the larger,
more complex issues. At all times, the ACO was honest and
straightforward with the contractor. They did not try to
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"play games" during the negotiations. The Hughes
representatives seemed to appreciate the ACO ' s candor. [Ref.
16]
The ACO explained that the contractor appeared to
feel comfortable with the study, due primarily to the fact
that they knew most of the study team members and had open
access to their analysis of the cost estimations. This was
a critical factor during negotiations, since the contractor
could see how the Government was deriving its numbers and led
to easier negotiations. This, in turn, led to a stronger
trust, and thereby better relations between the Government
and the contractor. [Ref. 15]
3. The Contractor's Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
Personnel at Sperry believed that the Overhead
Should Cost study did nothing to foster better relations
between the company and the Government. One contractor
representative expressed the opinion that the real aim of the
study was to " . . . drive the contractor into the lowest cost
situation, thereby telling the company how to run their
business." [Ref. 19]
In certain areas, contractor representatives felt
that they were receiving good information to better their
standing in the industry. Many of the findings, however,
were in areas that couldn't be addressed as separate issues.
The company felt that overhead rates and overhead problems
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are not solitary. They felt that in order to fully present
the findings in the overhead area, the total costs of all
associated areas should be addressed. They therefore took a
very firm stand in negotiations and refused to fully accept
the Government's position. [Ref. 19]
Management at Sperry was not happy with the way
Government brought in additional outside analysts at
different points during the study. Each time a new person
appeared, regardless of the functional area assigned, that
person needed to be given background into the operation of
the area. The company felt that they were continually giving
the same information over and over again. They found it hard
to believe that these outside analysts could give a thorough
view of the functional area assigned, in order to give
credence to the findings and recommendations made during
negotiations. [Ref. 19] Additionally, management was upset
with the Government for performing the study in the first
place. At the time of the study's inception, Sperry was
merging with Burroughs to become UNISYS Corporation.
Management was changing hands, procedures were being updated
and changed, and the entire system was being reorganized.
How the Government could come up with an effective Overhead
Should Cost study was a question that caused concern with the
contractor. [Ref. 19; Ref. 17]
Finally, interviews with Sperry management and
NAVPRO personnel showed that the major problem encountered
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during the study and throughout negotiations, was the
Government's refusal to give the contractor any of the
background information on the analysis of the functional
areas. This meant that the contractor had no idea as to the
validity of the findings, when presented during negotiations.
The denial of this information caused management to feel that
they were not trusted, causing ill-feelings towards the
Government in this area. [Ref. 17; Ref . 19]
The accumulation of all of these problems caused
a feeling of doubt to be present in the minds of Sperry's
Management and led to a decline in relations between the
contractor and Government. [Ref. 17; Ref. 19]
b. Lockheed Study
Contractor representatives interviewed noted that
the situation at Lockheed created a feeling that the
relations were not bettered by the Overhead Should Cost study
performed there, but they were not damaged either. [Ref. 20]
The main question that caused concern for
Lockheed was the validity of the claims made by the ACO
during negotiations. As in the Sperry study, the Management
at Lockheed questioned the accuracy of outside inspectors,
who could not fully appreciate the internal concerns of the
company. [Ref. 20] Therefore, how could the ACO support his
position in negotiations, using information provided by
individuals who were not familiar with the operation of the
company? Additionally, the company questioned the ACO ' s
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knowledge in the areas he was negotiating; since he did not
personnally audit those areas? These questions forced
Lockheed to assume a stronger position during negotiations
and kept them from bargaining as freely as they would do
normally. [Ref. 20]
These situations did not harm the relationship
between Government and contractor, but they definitely did
not better relations. [Ref. 20]
c. Hughes Study
The representatives interviewed at Hughes, felt
that at the time the Overhead Should Cost study was performed
at their plant, the study did foster better relations between
the Government and themselves. Recently, however, this
attitude has changed dramatically. Both situations will be
presented here.
Hughes agreed to the recommendations and findings
of the study based upon the presentation of the analysis
behind the findings. The recommendations were well-
negotiated and Management felt that they could perform to
these levels. They were forward-thinking and wanted to be
competitive in their industry, so the lower cost figures
could help them to be more competitive, and thereby gain more
business in the future. In this sense then, the relations
between the Government and the contractor were improved.
[Ref. 21]
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Only recently has this situation changed. Since
the inception of the Overhead Should Cost rate agreement, the
business base at Hughes has declined dramatically.
Management feels that the agreement was based upon a business
base that, at the time, was expanding. In three years since
the agreement was made, Hughes has found themselves
financially hurt by the decisions agreed to in the study.
[Ref. 21]
Additionally, they were further hurt by the
Government's insistence that Hughes continue to base future
overhead rates upon the rates agreed to in the Overhead
Should Cost study, even though the business base had
declined. To quote one source: "Had the Government been in
our shoes, they would have been screaming for renegotiation
of the overhead rates." [Ref. 21]
Further, individuals interviewed expressed the
opinion that, at the time of the study, there was pressure
from the "Washington Bureaucracy" to sign up to the
recommendations of the Overhead Should Cost study. The
company felt pressured to make an agreement, so that it could
look good in the eyes of the Government. [Ref. 21]
It appears to this researcher that these
embittered feelings towards the Government, and the Overhead
Should Cost study in particular, have not improved relations
between the contractor and the Government. [Ref. 21]
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D. USE OF SHOULD COST RESULTS IN NEGOTIATIONS
One of the basic purposes for performing a Should Cost
study of any type, is to develop a position for the
Government to utilize in subsequent negotiations of that
contract. [Ref. 3:p. 2] This section will discuss the
strategy behind the Government's use of the Overhead Should
Cost studies in negotiations. It will also look at the
negotiations at each contractor location, in regard to the
Government and contractor position before, during, and after
the negotiations took place.
1 . Government Buying Agencies Viewpoint
a. Sperry, Lockheed, and Hughes Studies
The Overhead Should Cost studies performed at
each contractor location had a similar goal concerning
negotiations. Each study was to be the foundation used to
build the pre-negotiation clearance. The Government's
position was to be established prior to entering
negotiations, utilizing the Overhead Should Cost study as the
principal source of this position. [Ref. 12; Ref. 13; Ref.
14]
Government interviewees indicated that each of
the studies had similar procedures regarding the negotiation
process . The ACO would be the chief Government
representative during negotiations. He or she would rely
heavily upon the Overhead Should Cost study for establishment
of a Government position and supporting documentation for
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this position. The study could be used as a "hammer" if
necessary, although use of this technique was not
anticipated. [Ref. 13; Ref. 14; Ref. 15]
The use of ACOs as chief negotiators served to
get the ACOs more involved in the total process. It was
reasoned that the contractor should feel more relaxed and
familiar with the ACO, since they deal with the ACO on a
daily basis. Additionally, even though the ACOs did not get
deeply involved in the Should Cost study itself, they did
possess significant knowledge of the contractor's accounting
system. Therefore, they were best suited to defend the
Should Cost study's positions. [Ref. 13]
2. Government Contract Administration Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
At Sperry, the ACO viewed the negotiations with
the contractor as strained and difficult, at best [Ref. 17].
The problems stemmed from several sources.
From the inception, the ACOs interviewed stated
that they did not have a good grasp of the findings and
recommendations of the study, since the majority of the work
was performed by individuals outside of their command. This
led to some uncertainty for the ACO during negotiations;
especially when the documentation being used to support the
Government's position was unfamiliar. [Ref. 17]
This uncertainty and unfamiliarity was compounded
by the rotation of inspecting personnel, by the Government,
45
during the study. The ACO found it difficult to support
information that was gathered by one individual and then
continued and updated by another individual; due to the
departure and subsequent replacement of the first individual.
[Ref. 17]
As noted previously, Sperry was undergoing a
major corporation change during the time of the Overhead
Should Cost study. This also created problems during
negotiations. The ACO found it very difficult to get the
contractor to agree on many points, without the intervention
of the representatives of the other companies involved in the
merger. It was difficult to present recommendations based
upon a company that, for all intents and purposes, no longer
existed as it was before the study began. Many issues needed
to be broadened to fit the new corporation. In some cases,
the recommendations were no longer valid and hence, could not
be negotiated as proposed. [Ref. 17]
These problems made the negotiations with Sperry
very difficult. The ACO did make some progress in areas that
could be applied to the newly established company, but, at
the time of this research, negotiations were still in
progress. [Ref. 17]
b. Lockheed Study
Negotiations at Lockheed had similar problems for
the ACO, as those encountered at Sperry.
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The ACO at Lockheed felt uncomfortable using a
study with which he was not fully involved. He was pressed
by the contractor to defend the positions developed by
individuals outside of the NAVPRO, who did not know the
accounting system. [Ref. 18] Additionally, the contractor
felt that the Overhead Should Cost team members were not well
versed in overhead cost analysis. [Ref. 20]
As mentioned earlier, Lockheed did not receive an
in-depth copy of the Overhead Should Cost study, during
negotiations. This lack of information to the contractor
created an additional feeling of mistrust between the
contractor and the Government. This mistrust, was difficult
to overcome by the ACO and lengthened his efforts to reach an
agreement. [Ref. 20]
The areas that the ACO did have success in
negotiating, were those that he could "bottom line," vice
carry out a lengthy cost explanation. [Ref. 20]
Although negotiations were completed, it was felt
that the ACO s position had deteriorated in the eyes of the
contractor, due to the way the study was "dropped in his lap
without proper background." [Ref. 20]
c. Hughes Study
At Hughes, the negotiations between the DCASPRO
ACO and the contractor were relatively smooth. The ACO
presented the Government's position, drawing largely upon the
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Overhead Should Cost study results as supporting
documentation. [Ref. 15]
The ACO used a strategy of straightforward, no-
nonsense data presentation to establish critical points
throughout the negotiations. Since the results of the
Overhead Should Cost study were made available to the
contractor, this straightforward approach was effective,
since the ACO could point out many of the arguments from the
study, directly to the contractor. [Ref. 16]
By utilizing their own people in the study, the
ACO could call upon the individuals who worked on specific
functional areas of the study, during negotiations, to
present their analysis or methodology behind a particular
finding. This availability of team members during the
negotiations created a solid support team for the ACO to draw




In the view of the management of Sperry, the
negotiations between the Government and Sperry have been
difficult at best. As previously mentioned, Sperry, felt
that: "The role of the Government in this situation was to
drive the overhead rates down, regardless of the costs to be
considered." [Ref. 19] Additionally, Sperry felt that the
overhead rates were not the only issue. The overhead rates
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and costs associated with those rates, should be approached
with more of the total costs in mind. It was felt that the
fixed costs needed to be figured into the overhead analysis,
in order to provide a more complete picture of the cost to be
considered. This position was addressed vigorously during
negotiations and was a major point of contention between the
Government and the contractor. [Ref. 19]
Contractor representatives also noted that the
Government was using the Overhead Should Cost study as a "Big
Stick" to drive home it's positions. This feeling was
compounded by the Government's reluctance to provide the
contractor with the analytical background to the study before
negotiations. This caused a feeling of distrust between the
two parties that hampered the negotiations. [Ref. 19]
b. Lockheed Study
At Lockheed, the negotiations took a similar tone
to the negotiations at Sperry. Interviewees at Lockheed felt
very strongly that trying to perform a Should Cost study of
just the overhead costs would not provide an accurate picture
of the contractor's operation. They felt that all of the
costs should have been considered, and presented this
position during the negotiations. Management felt that many
of the findings of the study could have been presented
differently, had the total costs been considered. [Ref. 20]
In addressing the negotiations, management
realized that the ACO was not completely knowledgeable of the
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supporting documentation provided by the study. Therefore,
they challenged the ACO to provide as much factual evidence
as possible during negotiations, and to support that
documentation. This created tension between the parties, as
an appearance of mistrust was permeated. [Ref. 20]
c. Hughes Study
The negotiations at Hughes were considered, at
the time, to be fair and reasonable to management. There was
some concern about the rates agreed to, since they were based
upon an expanding business base for the company. But,
overall, the contractor felt that they could meet the
Government's position in most of the areas presented during
negotiations. This feeling has since been changed. [Ref.
21]
Hughes, now feels that the company was pressured
by the Government, during negotiations, to agree to the
positions presented by the study. Due to this pressure, the
negotiations were completed too quickly, with the contractor
not taking the time to thoroughly analyze the Government's
findings and recommendations. The contractor felt that had
there been more study into the effects of a possible
declining business base for the future, the overhead rates
would have been negotiated more vigorously. [Ref. 21]
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E. MOTIVATION FOR AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
This section will discuss the elements used by the
Government to motivate the contractor to implement the
recommendations made by each Overhead Should Cost study. It
will also discuss the rationale behind the recommendations
that were implemented by the contractor and those that were
not
.
It should be noted at this time that all of the
recommendations made by the Overhead Should Cost teams in
each of the three studies, were taken under consideration by
the contractors. During negotiations, not all of the
recommendations were agreed to and some actions were
negotiated out. All of the recommendations agreed to in the
negotiations have been implemented by each of the
contractors. Therefore, these specific findings and actions
will not be discussed.
1 . Government Buying Agencies Viewpoint
The views of the key Government players were similar
and will be addressed together.
Those interviewed felt that each contractor should be
internally motivated to improve his standing in his industry.
He needs to be aware of areas that can be made more efficient
and should be receptive to suggestions to improve those
areas. One of the purposes of the Should Cost study is to
identify ineffective operations and challenge the contractor
to correct thses deficiencies [Ref. 3:p. 2]. The contractor
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should be sufficiently motivated to take the recommendations
and use them to improve his company's position. If a
contractor is open-minded about utilizing the Should Cost
study's results to his advantage, he will need very little
external motivation to implement the recommendations. [Ref.
12; Ref. 13; Ref. 14]
As to the areas of implementation, there was a
consensus among the key Government players as to why some
recommendations were easier to implement by the contractor
and why some were more difficult.
As a general rule, findings and recommendations
presented in areas that were deemed as "non-personnel" (such
as ADP , IR&D, etc.), were easily negotiated, and quickly
taken aboard by the contractor. Issues that were seen as
"personnel related" (benefits, salaries, wages, retirement,
etc.), tended to be very difficult to address and negotiate.
[Ref. 12; Ref. 13]
Any time a recommendation deals with an area that
comes under possible union control, there is bound to be
hold-ups and snags in the negotiations. Contractors are not
easily convinced that they must cut back salaries, personnel,
or retirement and benefit packages. The contractor fought
hard and long to establish these salaries and benefits for
their employees. Getting the contractor to see the cost
benefits of cutting these areas was difficult in each study.
[Ref. 12; Ref. 13]
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2. Government Contract Administration Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
The views of the ACO at Sperry, as to the
motivation and implementation of recommendations, echoed the
thoughts of the Government interviewees noted in the
preceding paragraphs. The ACO felt that the contractor
should be internally motivated to take recommendations for
action that advance his position in the industry. Along with
this thought, the ACO considered competition to be an even
greater motivator. As the DoD decreases the amount of money
that they are going to be spending on contracts, the
contractor is going to be forced to do more with less.
Therefore, any recommendations to improve their company and
make it more competitive, should be welcomed by the
contractor. [Ref. 17]
Those recommendations with which the ACO had the
greatest difficulty, involved labor rates, compensation, and
benefit packages. Again, the contractor was very unwilling
to accept the recommendations for cutting costs in this area,
due to union pressure. Especially prevalent was the effect
of the merging companies. The contractor was not entirely
sure what type of labor package it would have after the new
company was established. This added to the difficulty in
implementing recommendations in the labor area. [Ref. 17]
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b. Lockheed Study
The ACO at Lockheed found that motivating the
contractor to implement recommendations was very difficult.
Lockheed had no real competition in this area to worry about.
Additionally, being a dual cognizance plant (AFPRO and
NAVPRO) caused motivation problems, as the contractor
frequently used the dual cognizance perception to down play
possible Government pressure. [Ref. 18]
In the ACO's perception, in trying to work with
the contractor to implement recommendations, the contractor
followed a similar acceptance level as that of Sperry. The
contractor would buy into any findings that provided a real
savings in the non-personnel areas. In many of the findings
involving labor and benefit cutbacks, the contractor took a
very hard line and refused to give into the recommendations.
[Ref. 18]
c. Hughes Study
At Hughes, the DCASPRO ACO found that motivating
the contractor to accept the recommendations of the study was
fairly easy. Hughes, as stated before, was highly interested
in improving its position in the industry and looked to the
study to provide guidance towards this goal . The ACO also
found that compromise and honesty were good motivators when
establishing the recommendations. In this case, the
competition and the company's internal drive were motivation
enough to implement most of the recommendations. [Ref. 15]
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Some areas were more difficult to motivate than
others. In this case, the areas included labor rates,
manpower levels, Corporate office space, and building lease
considerations. Overall however, the contractor made more
concessions, at an earlier time, than the other two
contractors. This could be attributed to management's
concern for growth in the industry and their reliance on the
Overhead Should Cost study's recommendations to assist them
to this end. [Ref. 16]
3. Contractor's Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
As the major motivator, Sperry representatives
expressed the feeling that competition and the need to be
competitive in the fixed-price environment, was essential.
They want and need all of their share of Government business.
This is not just to ensure profits for the company, but
merely to survive. The key then, is survival. This is
probably the single most key motivator. [Ref. 19]
As to the recommendations that the company chose
to implement, management personnel interviewed felt that the
recommendations having the greatest impact on the company's
competitive position, were the most useful, and easiest to
implement. [Ref. 19]
Considerations for implementation included the
effects of the recommendations on the newly established
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company which included Burroughs. This created special
problems in the labor and benefits area, as management was
unsure of the policies that would be implemented upon
completion of the two-company merger. [Ref. 19]
b. Lockheed Study
At Lockheed, the motivation factor most in use
was that of being competitive in the industry. Management
representatives felt that the Overhead Should Cost study
could be used to their benefit and was receptive to the
recommendations that they saw as helpful. They felt no other
compelling motivation towards implementing the
recommendations of the study. [Ref. 20]
Management personnel interviewed felt that there
were some good recommendations and did implement these
quickly. Some areas however, were considered unreasonable
and contained inconsistent guidance. These areas included
inflation consideration and ADP costs. Although these areas
were settled in negotiations, they provided a large area of
cost difference, that the contractor felt was not justified
by the Government. [Ref. 20]
c. Hughes Study
In this researcher's analysis, the management at
Hughes was probably the most motivated of the three
contractors at the beginning of the Overhead Should Cost
studies. They expressed the greatest desire to seek benefits
from the study, to help them improve their effectiveness in
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the industry. At the time, the company was growing and the
business base was expanding. The feeling was that if the
study could make them more competitive, perhaps they could
bid on more Government contracts, and be more effective in
implementing those contracts. Getting motivated to implement
the recommendations was not a concern at Hughes. [Ref. 21]
Due to this can-do attitude at Hughes, there were
no real problem areas that were not easily overcome during
negotiations. [Ref. 21; Ref. 15]
F. FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS AND IMPACT
1 . Government Buying Agencies Viewpoint
Government personnel expressed generally negative
feelings towards the necessity of follow-up action for each
of the Overhead Should Cost studies. Although there was a
consensus that some sort of follow-up should be performed to
assure contractor compliance with the recommendations of the
Should Cost studies, it was felt that the costs and
difficulties involved with selecting a follow-up review team,
outweighed the desire for follow-up action. [Ref. 12; Ref.
13; Ref. 22]
One Government interviewee indicated that there had
been some follow-up on the Lockheed study approximately one
year after the negotiations ended, but it did not entail a
large effort by the Government. The follow up was a three
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day review that checked the implementation of recommendations
for the past year. [Ref. 12]
Government personnel noted that the impact of
performing a large-scale follow-up would not produce the
savings necessary to justify the time and cost involved in
the follow-up. [Ref. 12; Ref. 13]
2. Government Contract Administration Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
The Overhead Should Cost study performed at
Sperry did not receive a follow-up review and the personnel
interviewed at the NAVPRO did not feel that one was
necessary. It was felt that since the recommendations
applied to the company before the two-company merger
occurred, any follow-up would be ineffective, as many of the
recommendations no longer apply to the new company. [Ref.
17]
The ACO did feel that a follow-up review could be
useful if it provided additional support for negotiations.
The follow-up could provide additional power and leverage to
aid the Government's position. In this specific instance
then, a follow-up could be useful. [Ref. 17]
b. Lockheed Study
The only follow-up review done by the Government
was performed approximately one year after the completion of
the Overhead Should Cost study at Lockheed. Although small
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in comparision with the Should Cost study effort, it did
provide the Government a feel as to the acceptance and
implementation of the recommendations by the contractor.
[Ref. 18]
The ACO noted that the follow-up went rather
smoothly and was well received by the contractor. He felt
that the idea of a follow-up is important, as it shows the
contractor that the Government cares about the study and its
results. He also stated that the NAVPRO does not have the
personnel or time to perform a follow-up analysis and
therefore appreciated the efforts of the Government. [Ref.
18]
Two problems noted by the ACO were addressed in
the follow-up study. First, the business base had changed
slightly since the Should Cost study was performed. This
caused some initial difficulties in evaluating the
contractor's implementation in several cost areas. This
problem was solved quickly through Government determination
of the new base and contractor compliance with the new
figures and modification of the cost areas involved.
Secondly, the ACO felt that the follow-up was done on
relatively short notice to the company and the NAVPRO. This
short notice caused some initial scrambling for data and
added to the difficulties experienced in the first problem.
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c. Hughes Study
There was no follow-up review performed on the
Overhead Should Cost study performed at Hughes. Personnel
interviewed at Hughes stated that since DCASPRO personnel
comprised the majority of the Should Cost study team, there
would be no follow-up from any outside source. If a follow-
up needs to be done, it was felt that the DCASPRO would
perform it.
Additionally, the ACO felt that since the DCASPRO
did the study, negotiated the contract, and is currently
administrating the contract, there is no need for a follow-
up. The review of the study is a normal function of the
DCASPRO, as it administers the contract. [Ref. 15]
3. Contractor's Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
A management representative interviewed at Sperry
felt very strongly that there should be more Government
follow-up after the Overhead Should Cost study was completed.
This follow-up should come from a fairly high source, such as
the Secretariat level. The follow-up should be conducted
with the company in a face-to-face manner and address the
"real issues" that the contractor deems most important. It
was felt that the ACO does not have enough clout to perform
the proper follow-up needed. The ACO cannot solve many
policy issues and the contractor would rather deal directly
with someone who can implement actions immediately after the
follow-up. [Ref. 19]
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In addition, this individual felt that the NAVPRO
does not have the time or manpower necessary to perform a
follow-up study. Without the manpower, time, or political
clout available, the NAVPRO is incapable of performing an
effective follow-up review of the Overhead Should Cost study.
b. Lockheed Study
Management personnel expressed a desire to meet
Government personnel engaged in a follow-up capacity, in
order to discuss the Overhead Should Cost study performed at
Lockheed. It was felt that the actual review of the
contractor's implementation of recommendations was
unnecessary, as the contractor should be trusted enough by
the Government to carry out the implementation of
recommendations agreed to during negotiations. The purpose
of a follow-up should be to assess the contractor's concerns
after the recommendations have been implemented, and address
problems associated with those findings.
c. Hughes Study
Management interviewed at Hughes were not
questioned on the effectiveness of a Government follow-up
review of the Overhead Should Cost study performed at Hughes.
G. OVERHEAD SHOULD COST IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS
The overall impact and effect of each study will be
addressed in this section. It will look at the Government's
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and respective contractor's feelings towards the success of
the study and problems associated with the Overhead Should
Cost study idea.
1 . Government Buying Agencies Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
Government representatives viewed the Overhead
Should Cost study at Sperry as effective and successful, in
spite of the difficulties experienced with the company merger
during the study.
It was pointed out that the study was successful
because it uncovered inefficiencies and areas for improvement
at Sperry, that could be initiated by the contractor whether
a merger was underway or not
.
Based upon the difficulties noted earlier in this
section, the extent and depth of the findings were
noteworthy, and were utilized to their fullest extent by the
Government. As one Government representative aptly put it;
"the findings and subsequent cost savings were nothing less
than heroic." [Ref. 12]
Another area identified through interviews of
Government team members was the increased ability of the ACO
to negotiate the Forward Rate Pricing Agreement. This
ability was increased because the Overhead Should Cost study
forced the ACO to delve deeply into the contractor's
accounting system, in order to assist the Should Cost team
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members in their analyses. Further clearances will be easier
to obtain, as will future reviews of the contractor's
accounting system. [Ref. 12; Ref. 13]
Government personnel did acknowledge that there
were some problems encountered with the contractor, in
relation to the fact that the Overhead Should Cost study was
performed during a very unsettling time for Sperry. Overall,
however, these problems were resolved quickly and the study
was completed successfully,
b. Lockheed Study
The Lockheed study was also deemed a success from
the viewpoint of the Government personnel interviewed. Since
it did not have the organization problems that were
experienced at Sperry, it was thought that the study went
very smoothly and efficiently. The study was effective in
that it was an excellent foundation upon which to build the
pre-negotiation clearance. [Ref. 12]
Government personnel expressed the view that the
study impacted the contractor in a positive manner. With the
implementation of the Overhead Should Cost recommendations,
the contractor is better equipped to be more competitive in
his industry. [Ref. 22]
Finally, the results of the study were also well-
received in the political arena. In the opinion of one
Government representative, the Overhead Should Cost study at
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Lockheed provided Congress with a positive indication that
this type of cost analysis is successful,
c. Hughes Study
Government representatives interviewed felt that
this was an extremely successful Overhead Should Cost study.
The recommendations implemented were representative of the
excellent cooperation between the Government and the
contractor
.
Government representatives noted that a key
indicator as to the future success of the study was the
contractor's positive approach to the study from the onset.
At the time, the contractor was very motivated to make the
study something that would provide him with ideas and
recommendations that would make him more competitive. It was
felt that the study accomplished this very effectively.
Therefore the study was thought to have a positive impact on
the contractor, as well as the Government. [Ref. 14]
2. Government Contract Administration Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
Personnel interviewed at NAVPRO Sperry had a
different view of the effectiveness and impact of the
Overhead Should Cost study. The consensus of these
individuals was that the study was not effective and did not
benefit the company or the NAVPRO.
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First, the study was considered ill-timed. By
performing an in-depth analysis during a major organizational
change, the Government gave the impression to the contractor
that it was more concerned with just getting the study done,
than the actual results. No thought was given to the
problems incurred after Sperry merged with Burroughs. It was
felt that the NAVPRO would have to sort out these problems as
they occurred.
One interviewee noted that there was little
thought given to the possibility of the base decreasing after
the study was completed. With a declining base, the
contractor becomes less apt to implement many of the
recommendations, due to the large losses that would result
from lowering his overhead levels. [Ref. 17]
Secondly, the ACO stated that her lack of
knowledge concerning the findings and how those findings were
developed, hampered her negotiation position. If the study
had been done by the NAVPRO, the background would have been
familiar to her. This weakened negotiation position was
realized by the contractor, which compounded the difficulty
of the negotiation efforts. [Ref. 17]
Finally, it was felt that the contractor did not
like the intrusion into the company and therefore was very
uncooperative with the team members. This was extended in
part to the NAVPRO members and caused relations to decline
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from the time the study started. None of the individuals
interviewed wanted to be a part of another Overhead Should
Cost study at any level again.
b. Lockheed Study
The feelings of those personnel interviewed at
NAVPRO Lockheed were very similar to those expressed at
Sperry. It was felt that the study was not well-planned, did
not improve relations, and could have achieved the same
results if performed by NAVPRO personnel. [Ref. 18]
The ACO noted that the Overhead Should Cost study
lacked any real impact with the contractor. Recommendations
that could easily be implemented by the contractor and which
benefited his position, were done rather smoothly. Those
recommendations the contractor felt were unreasonable, were
simply not implemented. The ACO had a difficult time
convincing the contractor to attempt implementation of these
recommendations. [Ref. 18]
Overall, the Overhead Should Cost study was not
effective in the minds of those NAVPRO individuals
interviewed and would not be recommended in the future.
c. Hughes Study
The personnel interviewed at DCASPRO Hughes were
very positive about the effectiveness and impact of the
Overhead Should Cost performed.
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Because the study was performed by DCASPRO
personnel, the background to the analysis was readily
available for negotiations, as well as the personnel who
performed the analysis. Due to this, the negotiations went
very smoothly and effectively. [Ref. 15]
Additionally, the ACO felt that the study was
well-received by the contractor, due to the in-house effort
and the contractor's positive attitude to the study. This
positive feeling towards the study lessened the impact of the
findings and made negotiations of the more difficult areas
easier. [Ref. 15]
The individuals interviewed agreed that the
Overhead Should Cost study, as performed, was very successful
and could be done again, with similar results.
3. Contractor's Viewpoint
a. Sperry Study
In the opinion of the management representatives
interviewed, the effectiveness of the Overhead Should Cost
study performed at Sperry was greatly diminished by the lack
of knowledge and clout of the ACO. By not being totally
involved in the study, the ACO did not have the total scope
of the analysis performed in each functional area. This
became evident during negotiations and was exploited by the
contractor to his benefit. [Ref. 19]
The major area of concern for the contractor was
expressed by one interviewee, who stated that the Should Cost
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study should include all of the costs, not just overhead.
"Should Cost means the analysis of labor, material, and value
added costs; not just overhead." [Ref. 19] He indicated
that the Government should go beyond the overhead costs and
make recommendations on the basis of the "total picture."
[Ref. 19]
This position was the main complaint made by the
individuals interviewed at Sperry. As far as they were
concerned, the Government was being too specific in their
analysis. They were trying to force cost cuts without taking
the whole picture into consideration. This concern was the
major impact of the study,
b. Lockheed Study
The management representative interviewed from
Lockheed expressed nearly the same opinion as Sperry on the
effectiveness and impact of the Overhead Should Cost study.
He felt that the ACO lacked the support necessary to carry
the Government's position during negotiations. He did feel
that the ACO presented the Government's position well,
despite a lack of in-depth knowledge of the analysis
presented in the study. In some cases, the study examined
areas previously analyzed by th NAVPRO . The interviewee
questioned the Government need to re-analyze these areas. In
his opinion, there was too much overkill in several areas of
the study. [Ref. 20]
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As in the Sperry study, the Lockheed
representative felt the Government needed to address all of
the costs associated with the pricing determination, not just
the overhead costs. Along with this thought, the Government
might also compare other divisions in the company to help
establish the pricing agreement. [Ref. 20]
c . Hughes Study
As previously mentioned, management's view of the
effects and impact of the Overhead Should Cost study
performed at Hughes, changed dramatically over the period of
performance of the contract.
At its inception and throughout its performance
and negotiation, Hughes was very supportive of the study. In
one interview with a key management representative at the
time of the study, it was considered to be a source of
recommendations that could prove to be very productive to the
company. Therefore, management was eager to implement those
findings they considered as beneficial to their future.
[Ref. 21]
After a few years however, the business base for
the company declined significantly, dramatically affecting
the prices agreed to in the Overhead Should Cost study.
Looking back at the agreement, management believed that they
were pressured by the Government into agreeing to the
recommendations of the study.
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Interviews have indicated that the impact of the
agreement negotiated by the contractor and the Government
became quite significant. Due to the losses suffered by the
contractor, there is a great deal of anger expressed towards
the use of any Should Cost study. To quote one management
representative: "If someone brought in a Should Cost
proposal to me right now, I'd probably shoot him!"
H . SUMMARY
This chapter has addressed the responses to questions
posed by this researcher to members of Government and
contractor personnel involved in the Overhead Should Cost
studies at the three contractors previously mentioned. The
chapter has covered team makeup, relations fostered by the
study, effects of the study on negotiations, motivation
towards implementation of recommendations, follow-up
considerations, and overall effectiveness and impact of the
studies
.
The following chapter will analyze these responses and
their impact on the Should Cost concept.
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V. ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the researcher's analysis of the
issues critical to the Should Cost methodology. These issues
will be presented from the topical areas developed from the
questions posed during interviews and described in the
previous chapters. The effects of each of the Overhead
Should Cost studies will be analyzed in the areas of team
organization, relationships, negotiations, implementation of
recommendations, follow-up actions, and overall impact and
effectiveness
.
B. SHOULD COST TEAM ORGANIZATION
The organizational structure of the two Overhead Should
Cost teams at Sperry and Lockheed were similar. In analyzing
this organization, it appears that there was an emphasis on
utilizing the knowledge base of the different Government
agencies participating in the studies. The theory behind
this organization was to have the Director and Deputy
Director positions on both teams filled by representatives of
the Government buying agency sponsoring the study. The team
leaders in each of the functional areas consisted of
personnel from other Government buying agencies, and the ACO
from the parent NAVPRO. The team members consisted of
personnel from other Government buying agencies, DCAA, and
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personnel available at the NAVPRO . These personnel were
disbursed throughout the functional areas in accordance with
their respective expertise.
This organization left the ACO with the responsibility of
only a portion of the study. The ACOs had a good
understanding of the supporting documentation for the
findings in the functional area that they directed. However,
since the majority of the analysis in the other functional
areas were performed by persons from other Government
agencies, and these other analysts left shortly after
completing their portion of the study, the ACOs had little
knowledge of the techniques used in developing the supporting
documentation for those functional areas. It is easy to see
why both ACO's felt that they did not have a good grasp of
all the findings that they were required to negotiate.
In contrast to this organizational makeup, was the
organizational construction in the Hughes study. In this
case, the ACO was more directly involved in the overall
development of the functional areas and performance of the
analysts. The ACO was given the title of Assistant Should
Cost Director and was directly responsible for the
development of findings from all of the functional area team
leaders. Additionally, all of the team leaders were from the
DCAS Region or in-house DCASPRO . This facilitated the
availability of the team leaders during negotiations and gave
the ACO stronger support during the negotiation process.
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By being more intimately involved in the total analysis
from the beginning, the ACO at Hughes was confident in his
supporting documentation and was better able to support the
findings presented in negotiations. The negotiations went
more smoothly and the ACO was able to secure an agreement
with the contractor in a relatively short period of time.
In analyzing the studies at Sperry and Lockheed, it
appears that the organization of each study was drawn up
without regard for the negotiations or the ACO ' s negotiating
position. The organizational pre-planning did not address
the effective use of in-house NAVPRO personnel, when
developing the teams for each of the functional areas in the
studies. By not utilizing the in-house NAVPRO personnel in
positions of greater authority and not giving the ACO a
position of greater involvement, the effectiveness of the ACO
in leading the negotiations was greatly diminished.
C. RELATIONSHIPS FOSTERED BY THE STUDIES
As previously noted, the makeup of the teams that
performed the Overhead Should Cost studies at Sperry and
Lockheed consisted of a large number of individuals from
Government buying agencies outside of the on-site NAVPROS
.
This use of outside analysts caused many problems at both
contractor sites that directly effected the relations between
the contractor and Government representatives.
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In theory, a Should Cost study should be performed by a
team of analysts from outside of the parent Government
Contract Administration entity. This outside analysis is
designed to give the Government an in-depth understanding of
the contractor's cost elements, without putting an additional
workload on the on-site Government entity. This theory also
suggests that the outside analysis will dig deeper and be
less biased. The contractor would therefore be more
receptive to the information supplied by this study, as it
would be more exact and thorough in presenting cost savings.
The relations between the contractor and the Government would
therefore be improved, as the contractor would have a better
understanding of the Government's requirements. This
researcher was therefore surprised to find that the
contractors were less than receptive to the findings and
displayed a negative attitude towards the Government.
At both Sperry and Lockheed, the contractor took the
position that the findings developed by the analysts from the
Government buying agencies were not creditable, due to the
analysts' lack of knowledge of the contractor's
organizational and accounting systems. The contractors
claimed that the analysts were too critical of a system that
they did not work with and were not flexible in their
assessment of deficiencies. They became less flexible and
willing to work with the Government, creating a non-
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cooperative attitude, and thereby deteriorating relations
between the two parties.
Compounding this situation, contractor personnel
continually had to brief new analysts in most functional
areas, as the Government continually replaced personnel
throughout the study. The contractor resented having to
bring these new analysts up-to-speed, before they could begin
their analysis. Sperry and Lockheed both viewed the study as
more of a hindrance than a help.
In this researcher's analysis, there was some validity in
the contractor's statement that the analysts did not
understand or appreciate the contractor's organization.
Outside analysts do not fully understand the contractor's
operation and might not take all circumstances into
consideration when developing their findings. That can be
the outside analyst's strength, as they will normally stick
to the facts and not digress outside of a cost area.
However, because the majority of the analysts were from
outside of the on-site NAVPRO, they would not be concerned
with improving relations with the contractor. They could
afford to take a harder line in their analysis and thereby
not take the contractor's concerns into consideration. These
analysts performed their work, summarized their findings,
made recommendations, dropped the whole thing in the ACO's
lap to negotiate, and went home.
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In support of this analysis is the Hughes study. In this
case, the contractor did not cite major disagreements with
the analysts' procedures in any area. Because the majority
of the analysts participating in the study were from the
local DCASR and DCASPRO , the contractor could not claim that
the analysts did not understand their operations or
accounting system. The analysts were well-acquainted with
the contractor's operations and related well with the
contractor during the study. Therefore, the claims of
analysts not being flexible and too critical of the
contractor's systems, did not occur. Relationships between
the contractor and the DCASPRO were enhanced by the increased
working relationships fostered by the study.
D. NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS
In analyzing the effectiveness of negotiations at each of
the contractor sites, this researcher looked at the problems
encountered during negotiations at Sperry and Lockheed, and
compared the situations with the successful negotiations that
occurred at Hughes
.
The negotiations that took place at Sperry and Lockheed
had similar problem areas. In both instances, the ACO ' s had
little support from on-site personnel and felt less than
knowledgeable with the conclusions of the studies. This
researcher's analysis showed that the contractors were well
aware of the ACO ' s situation and used this to their
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advantage. They continually challenged the analysts'
findings and the ACO's knowledge of specific findings. They
purposely took a much harder stand on the more difficult
personnel issues, knowing that the ACO would be hard pressed
to achieve the Government's position.
This strategy was compounded by Sperry, as they argued
that many recommendations could not be applied to their new
organization, without further study and analysis.
Additionally, the contractor was never shown the actual
analysis of the findings at anytime before or during the
negotiations. This caused the contractor to distrust the
recommendations that much more.
In this researcher's analysis, the ACOs at Sperry and
Lockheed had no choice but to use each study's findings as a
"Big Stick" in order to achieve many of the recommendations.
Without the proper support, the study itself would have to be
used as a negotiation tool. This negotiation strategy used
by the ACOs, reinforced the contractor's view that the study
was being "forced down their throats" by the Government.
Analysis of the Hughes negotiations indorses a smooth
transaction process. This was due primarily to the
successful performance of the study by the DCASPRO. The
analysts were on-hand to assist the ACO with the
negotiations. Many of the recommendations had been discussed
with the contractor before negotiations began, thereby
assuring a smooth negotiation.
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Additionally, by dealing with familiar personnel during
the study, the contractor felt that the recommendations
should be in his best interest. He was therefore more
flexible and willing to give concessions in the more
difficult areas.
E. IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Motivating the contractor to implement recommendations
was a difficult task for the ACOs at Sperry and Lockheed,
while the ACO at Hughes found little problem in getting
Hughes to implement recommendations.
The Government assumed that the contractors would be
internally motivated to implement the recommendations of the
studies. Being in a competitive industry, any contractor
should be willing to take cost-effective recommendations
aboard. Sperry and Lockheed proved otherwise.
Analysis shows that both contractors believed in the
conceptual theory of the Should Cost study. They were
willing to take the non-personnel recommendations into
immediate consideration, but the recommendations concerning
personnel cutbacks were hard fought. Neither felt any
internal motivation to cut personnel costs, as these costs
were the core of their operation. Both knew that much of
their overhead rates were based upon the labor rates, fringe
benefits, and other personnel related items. Neither
contractor was willing to take cuts in these valuable areas.
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Sperry had little motivation to implement any of the
recommendations, as they wanted to have as little change as
possible during the two-company merger. Improvements in the
operation of the facilities could be easily absorbed into the
new corporation, but personnel rate changes may cause
problems with the merger.
Lockheed had a similar reaction to cutting personnel
related costs. Being a dual cognizance plant and generally a
sole source for the submarine missile systems, Lockheed had
little competitive motivation. Therefore, they were very
adverse to implementing personnel cutbacks.
The ACOs at Sperry and Lockheed were aware of the lack of
internal motivation present in the contractors. All they
could do was be as persuasive as possible in the personnel
areas, citing the study as support. This, of course, was
seen as a strong arm tactic by the contractors, which led to
more hard feelings between the parties and increased
difficulties in negotiations.
The successful implementation of recommendations at
Hughes can be attributed to a stronger internal motivation by
the contractor, as well as the smooth operation of the study
itself. This researcher's analysis indicates that Hughes was
far more interested in improving its competitive position in
the industry, than were Sperry or Lockheed. They were more
willing to gamble with the Government's recommendations, in
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order to gain ground on their competitors and perhaps secure
additional Government contracts.
F. FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS
There was no in-depth follow-up action taken by the
Government in any of the three studies with the exception of
a small three day follow-up at Lockheed, approximately one
year after the completion of the study.
Analysis indicates that the Government does not have the
time or the personnel to perform in-depth follow-up actions.
However, the Government could consider some sort of follow-on
be performed by the in-plant Government Contract
Administration activity.
To assist the ACO during the negotiations, the Government
could arrange for one or two of the key analysts to return to
the plant to assist the ACO in negotiations. This would help
the ACO with the background support needed and give him more
clout to negotiate the tougher recommendations.
Another smaller follow-up effort that the Government
could do, would be to meet with the contractor at some later
time, after completion of the study. This would give the
contractor the opportunity to express his opinions on the
effectiveness of the study. This information could then be
used in future Should Cost efforts.
80
G. OVERALL IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS
The overall impact and effectiveness of the three studies
was perceived differently at the various levels of Government
involvement. Based on analysis, this researcher can conclude
that neither the impact nor the effectiveness were as great
as the Government believed.
Although there were many inefficiencies and areas for
improvement identified, not all of the recommendations were
implemented by the contractors. Additionally, one can argue
that many of these areas could have been identified by normal
internal analysis at the Contract Administration level.
Exactly which findings would have been identified through
normal internal audit is difficult to determine. However,
this determination is not key to the impact of the studies.
The findings and recommendations presented by the
Government aided all three contractors, by pointing out
deficiencies in their operations, that would make them more
efficient. Whether the contractor agreed to the
implementation of those recommendations or not, the
Government could point to those findings as making the
contractor more efficient and thereby cost effective. In
this sense, the studies had a positive impact and were
effective
.
The impact of the studies on the contractors went beyond
the apparent cost considerations. In all three of the
studies, the contractor was left with ill feelings towards
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the Government, in respect to the Should Cost process. Even
the Hughes study caused feelings of opposition towards the
Government, after the contractor's business base
deteriorated. None of the studies improved relations between
the Government and contractor. In fact, due to the lack of
Government support, the ACOs may have lost future negotiating
position and Government Contract Administration personnel at
these sites may find the working relations with contractor
personnel strained.
This negative impact of the studies may be related to the
future effectiveness of the Government at these activities.
In this respect then, the Should Cost studies did not provide
a positive impact and were not effective.
In all of the studies, the contractors voiced the opinion
that the Government should not be limiting the study to the
overhead area. All of the costs associated with the
operation of the company should be factored into the study in
order to get the total effect of all costs in the overhead
area
.
In this researcher's analysis, the claim that all of the
costs should be considered for a Should Cost study has some
merit. By including all costs, the Government would get a
total picture of the contractor's operation. But that is not
what the Government wants, when it is looking at the overhead
area. The Government is interested in the overhead costs
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only, as this area is highly susceptible to contractor cost
over-run.
Based on this analysis, the studies were effective in
analyzing and identifying problem areas in the overhead cost
area.
H . SUMMARY
This chapter has addressed critical issues developed in
the researcher's analysis of the three Overhead Should Cost
studies. The final chapter presents conclusions,
recommendations, areas for future study, and answers to the
primary and secondary research questions.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the
effectiveness of the Overhead Should Cost study, as it
relates to three studies performed at three separate
contractor sites. This information can be used as a tool for
developing future Should Cost studies, in the area of
overhead costs, or any specific cost areas.
To accomplish this analysis, this researcher examined the
three studies performed and interviewed key Government and
contractor personnel involved in each study. Government and
contractor positions on the effectiveness of the studies have
been presented in the previous chapters, as well as this
researcher's analysis of the key issues that affect the
Should Cost methodology.
This chapter will present conclusions derived from the
thesis and recommendations for improving the Should Cost
process. Areas for future research will then be presented.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1 . In two of the three Overhead Should Cost studies, the
Should Cost team organization did not allow the ACOs enough
responsibility to ensure an effective negotiation position .
Both ACOs expressed that their unfamiliarity with the
studies hampered their efforts during negotiations, to secure
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many of the recommendations that the studies presented. The
one ACO that was involved as the Shoud Cost study assistant
director, had a much stronger understanding of the analysis




Relations between the Government and the contractors
were not improved by performing the studies .
In two of the three studies, the use of Government
personnel from activities other than the on-site Contract
Administration activity, led to a decline in the relations
between the Government and contractor personnel . As shown in
Chapter IV of this thesis, contractor personnel took offense
to "outsiders" analyzing their activity and recommending
corrective action for discrepancies in areas that the
analysts were unfamiliar with. Additionally, contractors
cited Government pressure and lack of ACO support as other
detriments to Government and contractor relations.
3 Negotiations were hampered by the Government's use of
the studies as a "Big Stick" to pressure the contractors to
implement recommendations .
In all of the studies, the contractors expressed the
belief that the Government used the studies to pressure the
contractors to implement recommendations, without proper
supporting documentation. This pressure caused the
contractors to take stronger positions on several issues and
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hampered the normal give-and-take bargaining sessions that
are beneficial to successful negotiations.
4
.
In two of the three studies, the contractors
displayed little motivation to implement recommendations,
causing an additional onus upon the ACOs to successfully
negotiate the studies .
Analysis showed that neither of the two contractors
noted were worried about improving their position in the
industry. One was merging with another Defense related
company and the other was a sole source in a very specialized
procurement of Defense material. This lack of motivation
towards each studies' recommendations, made negotiating the
recommendations very difficult for the ACO . The one
contractor who was internally motivated to improve its
position in the industry, readily agreed to implementing most
of the recommendations of their study, providing for a smooth
negotiation
.
5 In two of the three studies, follow-on analysis was
not performed by the Government .
In the one instance that a follow-on analysis was
performed, both the ACO and contractor agreed that the
follow-on showed support for the Should Cost program and gave
the contractor an additional outlet to vent his opinion of
the study to the Government.
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6 • The three Overhead Should Cost studies performed may
have hampered future relations between on-site Government
Contract Administration Personnel and the contractor .
Due to increased bitterness towards the Government
over the practicality of the studies, ACO and Government
personnel may experience future problems relating to and
working with management of these companies. The solid
working relationships developed between the two parties has




When considering future Should Cost efforts, consider
using the in-house Government Contract Administration
activity as the main source for team selection .
Given the time and support of other local Government
agencies, in-house performance of Should Cost studies can be
more efficient (through greater contractor cooperation), less
time consuming, and save the Government additional travel and
accommodation expenses. Additionally, relations between the
Government and the contractor should not be adversely
affected. Consideration should be given to the workload
requirements of the in-house agency and include local
Government agencies for support.
2 Give the ACO or whoever will be negotiating the
study, a more active role in the determination of those
findings .
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Involving the ACO , or whoever has responsibility for
negotiating the study's findings, from the beginning of the
study is vital to ensuring his full comprehension of those
findings. Given the total picture of how the findings were
developed, as well as analytical documentation, the
negotiator will find his position enhanced, and lead to
smoother implementation of the recommendations of the study.
3 . Establish a follow-up visit by personnel from the
activity sponsoring the study within one year after
completion of the s tudy .
A follow-on visit will show Government support for
the study, ensure a smooth transition of recommendations into
implementation by the contractor, and give the contractor a
channel to express his views on the success or failure of the
study. This information can be used to enhance future
studies
.
D. ANSWERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
1 . Were selected Overhead Should Cost s tudie s performed
and negotiated by the Government in the most effective
manner ?
The areas that were significant in determining this
question were team selection and ACO support during
negotiations. The teams selected were effective in
identifying deficiencies in the contractor's operation, and
making recommendations to correct inefficiencies and improve
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contractor operation. Negotiations, however, could have been
better supported by the Government, thereby increasing the
ACO ' s effectiveness in achieving the studies objectives.
2
.
What has been the effect of the studies on the
relations between the Government and the contractor ?
Relations between the Government and the contractor
were not improved by the performance of the studies. In all
three of the cases, the studies caused an additional strain
on possible future associations between the Government and
contractor management
.
3 How might the Should Cost studies be improved as an
analytical tool in support of contract netotiation ?
This question is answered in the Recommendation
section of this Chapter. The key areas are: consideration
of in-house studies vice the traditional team selection
criteria, more ACO involvement, and follow-on study
consideration
.
E. ANSWER TO THE PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
How effective has the Government been in the selecti on
and execution of Overhead Should Cost studies ?
The answer to this question is found in Chapter V. The
effectiveness of the selection and execution of the Overhead
Should Cost studies can be expressed in two general areas.
The Government has been fairly effective in executing the
studies at the sites selected. The studies effectively
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identified contractor inefficiencies and recommended changes
to improve their operation. However, the studies could have
been performed more effectively, had consideration been given
to the negotiation process at the conclusion of the studies.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
1 . What should the ACQ ' s role be during the Should Cost
process ?
The ACO is normally the individual charged with the
responsibility of negotiating the recommendations after the
Should Cost study has been completed. At what level should
the ACO be initiated into the development of the study? What
authority should be given and how involved in the development
of the findings should he be?
2
.
What are the contractor's responses to specific
Should Cost recommendat ions?
How does the contractor base his negotiation position
relative to the recommendations of a Should Cost study? Why
were certain recommendations implemented and others not?
3 Should the Navy establish a Should Cost team to
perform all future Should Cost efforts ?
Organizing a Should Cost team is a difficult and time
consuming effort. This study could look into the costs and
benefits of establishing a regional or a national Should Cost
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